China’s vast land also implies a diverse community comprised of different ethnic groups (56 in the People’s Republic’s official list, plus more unregistered groups), supposedly. But with the policies of the Communist Party (CCP) that rules the mainland, even before the leadership of Xi Jinping, the country’s minorities face persecution from the State, drawing excoriation from the international community. Hottest issues involving China’s minorities are the draconian Sinicization policies on Tibet, once a country that failed to get international recognition and now has some of the strictest measures to prevent the return of Tibetan sovereignty, and on East Turkestan (also called Xinjiang), where an ethnocide is being conducted, arresting non-Han civilians and holding population control programmes, also to curb separatism movements.

Inner Mongolia is tasting the same anti-minority policy, but not as dire as Tibet and East Turkestan. Now, with the implementation of a bilingual education system on this day, the Inner Mongolian issue is brought up again, alarming fellow Mongolians in the neighbouring independent northern State. One question arises: how would the State of Mongolia respond to the situation in its southern counterpart occupied by PRC? Would it break the status quo between the two countries, or would it uphold the Mongolian identity and a united nation to highest levels?

Bland perceptions

The concept of “Inner” (övör (Mongol) / nei/monan (Chinese)) and “Outer” (ar (Mongol) /wai/mobei) was realised when the Qing Dynasty ruled the region (the latter was incorporated later in the late 17th century than the former). In 1911, the Outer (or northern) Mongols revolted, with Russian assistance, and founded the Bogd Khanate; attempts to include the Inner region flopped due to lack of support from both the Khanate’s allies and Inner Mongolians, thus it remained in China.

During the World War II, Marshal Khorloogiin Choibalsan of the succeeding Communist Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) kept his aims of taking the Inner region, with Soviet support. But the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty again prevented these aims to be fulfilled: Chinese General Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) has to recognise the MPR (though not the CCP, as a tit-for-tat move) to gain friendly relations with USSR, meaning the latter would not support Choibalsan’s wishes. This drew a solid line between the Outer and Inner regions.

After the bloody 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and the peaceful Mongolian Democratic Revolution of 1991, both pan-Mongolist and Inner Mongolian independence movements sprang up; the latter include:

  • the Inner Mongolian People’s Party, based in Princeton, NJ, USA and founded by Shovtsuud Temtselt,
  • the Southern Mongolian Democratic Alliance, founded by Hada and other pro-independence activists,
  • the Mongolian Liberal Union Party, founded in Osaka, Japan; with Olhnuud Daichin as a leader, and
  • the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Centre, representing Inner Mongolia in the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO).

PRC, however, has a tough policy on separatism, since it believes the Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu, consisting of various ethnic groups), or the territory thereof, is inseparable. Therefore, secessionist movements in the Inner region are clamped down, and arrests were made against activists like that of Hada in 1995.

The popularity of these movements is not prominent in both regions. Inner Mongolian masses do not show the same level of passion for independence and sovereignty Tibetans and Uyghurs display, though also feeling their identity is under attack by CCP’s policies. Meanwhile, the Mongolian State no longer shows interest in unifying the regions; it and PRC signed a treaty in 1994, respecting each other’s territorial integrity. Furthermore, Khalkha-centrists (Khalkha is the major ethnic group in the State) fear that a Greater Mongolia would incorporate “impure” Mongolians like Russia’s Buryats and the southern Mongolians in China (Inner Mongolia).

But even with bland perceptions toward each other, when the Mongolian identity gets attacked, both would show resistance.

Speak less Mongol

“Bilingual” education systems have been implemented in both East Turkestan and Tibet, incorporating more of Mandarin and less of the mother tongue in the regions’ curricula, thus drawing condemnation from activists, human rights groups and the international community. Ethnic Mongols heard of rumours last June of the plans to implement the same system in Inner Mongolia, changing the major mode of teaching from Mongolian to Mandarin, and parents were quick to resist.

These changes are applied in the guise of improving the quality of life of ethnic Mongols, since they get job opportunities disproportionately when compared with Han Chinese, though Mongols outperform the latter in school scores, and the recently-disposed system proved helpful to integrate them to the rest of the Chinese society. The views of linguistics graduate E. Bolormaa reflect the concerns of ethnic Mongolians: teaching in Mandarin is an attack not only on the Mongolian language but also on Mongolian culture and identity, and “will be a huge loss for everyone who uses Mongolian, not only in Southern Mongolia”.

Fearing for the death of their culture, parents staged protests throughout the region, clashing with security forces as their children were locked up in schools cordoned. One student succumbed after falling from the fourth floor of a school building in Khorchin Left Banner. Protests spread outside the region and had reached the Mongolian State, with civilians holding placards in traditional Mongolian script in front of the Foreign Ministry in Ulaanbaatar, and democratic icon and former president Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj expressed solidarity with the southern Mongols in a video.

But the protests have touched the issue of separation from China. “Even if this round of our resistance moment ends up with failure in the face of China’s brutal crackdown, the moment itself will help lay the firm foundation of our future movement for independence”, Hada said in a statement online.

Pressuring Mongolia

The new educational system is tantamount to an attack against a culture and an identity, but the State of Mongolia is yet to respond on the issue. President Khaltmaagiin Battulga has not yet released a statement, and the silence may be due to political reasons, since Mongolia has friendly relations with PRC. But Mongolian nationals disapprove of the complicity and join their southern counterparts to resist the move to implement the new education system.

This issue poses a challenge to the State: either keep peace with a regime having an ethnocidal-genocidal behaviour, or uphold the Mongolian identity by taking action against the “bilingual” system and PRC’s Sinicization policy. The State may decide to support Mongolian reunification, which I would gladly welcome and advocate, or at least Southern Mongolian independence, for the Mongolian identity in the Inner region will remain under attack by the CCP. But having no comment on the Inner Mongolian issue shows hypocrisy and lack of patriotism, for this would also be an attack against the Mongolian nation.

Battulga has to decide and act. The State has to change its policy on its southern neighbour.

Article posted on 01 September 2020, 15:49 (UTC +08:00).

Featured image: One of the protesters in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, in front of the country’s Foreign Ministry on 31 August 2020. Demonstrators condemn PR China’s plans to implement a “bilingual education system” in neighbouring Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and support southern Mongolian protesters, and also call for the Mongolian State to take action. Photo by Byambasuren Byamba-Ochir– AFP/Getty Images, via The New York Times.